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TORTS-NUISANCE

ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL AIRPORTs-Nestle

v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr.
568 (1972).
Plaintiffs, homeowners living near Santa Monica Municipal Airport, brought suit against the municipality of Santa Monica, the airport operator, seeking damages for diminution of property value and
personal injury resulting from jet aircraft noise. 1 The homeowners'
principal theory for recovery was that the jet noise emanating from
the airport constituted a nuisance. 2 Both the trial and the appellate
courts dismissed the nuisance action. The California Supreme Court
reversed. Held: a nuisance action against a municipal airport is not

precluded by governmental tort immunity. Nestle v. City of Santa
Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
I.

AIRCRAFT SOUND AND THE HOMEOWNERS' FURY

In the recent Report of the President's Aviation Advisory Commission, aviation noise was termed "the most explosive problem facing
aviation today." 3 In recent years homeowners who live near municipal
airports and absorb the brunt of the noise have become less inclined to
accept aviation noise as an inevitable incident of modern living and
more willing to resort to litigation for redress of their grievances. Several
factors account for this rapidly expanding volume of airport noise liti5
gation: 4 the widespread use of acoustically unsuppressed jet aircraft;
I. The Santa Monica Airport is a general aviation airport predominantly used by
small propeller craft with no regularly scheduled airline service from the field. The jet
flights complained of involved business executive jets. The total number of annual
operations from the field was estimated at 400,000. Of this number, jet operations totalled 109 in 1967 and 136 in 1968. See the statement of facts in the trial court opinion, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 10 Av. L. REP. (1969 Av. Cas.) 18,238 (Sup. Ct.
Los Angeles, Feb. 13, 1969).
2. Plaintiffs also asserted inverse condemnation, negligence, and zoning violation
theories. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the defendants on the
inverse condemnation theory and allowed the plaintiffs to amend the deficiencies in
their negligence and zoning counts.
3.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S AVIATION
NEEDS OF AVIATION 37 (Jan. 1, 1973).

ADVISORY COMMISSION,

LONG RANGE

4. The city attorney of Los Angeles reported on May 2, 1972, that pending suits
against the Los Angeles International Airport totalled almost four billion dollars. See
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, Appendix B, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6
Cal. 3d 920. 496 P.2d 480. 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
5. Aircraft for which type certificate application was made before December 1.
1969, are not subject to the FAA noise certification standards. See 14 C.F.R. § 36, et.
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the rapid growth of the aviation industry which has necessitated increased flight frequencies and expanded airport facilities; 6 and perhaps the expansive treatment of the subject in legal literature which
7
has increased awareness of the possibilities for suit.
The most common theories used by homeowners in compensatory
actions against municipal airports have been inverse condemnation
and nuisance. Inverse condemnation has been the most successful
theory of recovery for diminution of property value resulting from
aircraft noise,8 primarily due to its constitutional bases which ensure
that recovery may not be denied by legislative enactment. 9 Because of
sovereign immunity or the associated defenses of legalized nuisance
and discretionary function, a nuisance theory often is unavailable

when the defendant is a governmental entity, such as a municipal airport. As a result, recovery in nuisance seldom has been allowed
against a municipal airport. 10 In contrast to this general trend, Nestle

provides some encouragement for bringing nuisance actions against
municipal airports.
seq. (1972). These aircraft, such as the 707 and DC-8 models, comprise the bulk of
commercial aircraft in service, and they were designed and built to operate efficiently,
not to suppress noise. New aircraft such as the DC-10 were designed with noise suppression as a primary objective, and are much quieter than the older aircraft. However the
older 707 and DC-8 models will continue in service for some time. For a discussion of
the relative difference in takeoff noise levels between these aircraft, measured in accordance with FAA rules, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSPORTATION
NOISE AND ITS CONTROL 6 (1972).

6.

In 1960, U.S. scheduled airlines carried 58 million passengers. In 1970, they car-

ried 170 million. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES ASS'N OF AMERICA, INC., AEROSPACE FACTS

AND FIGURES III (197111972 ed.).
7. As the appellate court noted, there probably are more law review articles on the
subject of aircraft noise pollution than there are reported cases. Nestle, 19 Cal. App. 3d
869, 97 Cal. Rptr. 235, 241 (1971).
8. Tondel, Noise Litigation of Public Airports in U.S. OFFICE OF SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY, ALLEVIATION OF JET AIRCRAFT NOISE NEAR AIRPORTS: A REPORT OF THE

JET AIRCRAFT NOISE PANEL (1966), reports that 25 out of 27 cases in the period
1956-1966 in which damages were awarded were based on an inverse condemnation
theory. Inverse condemnation is the popular description of an action brought against a
governmental entity having the power of eminent domain to recover the value of prop:
erty which has been appropriated in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power.
Thornberg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
9. The U.S. CONST. amend. V requires states to pay compensation for private property "taken" for public use. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546 (1914). Both CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14, and WASH. CONST. art I, § 16 require compensation for private property "taken or damaged" for public use.
10. Of those cases surveyed by Tondel, supra, note 8, only one was a nuisance action
against a municipal airport rather than its users. In Chronister v. City of Atlanta, 99 Ga.
App. 447, 108 S.E.2d 731 (1959) the court held that a nuisance complaint stated a cause
of action against a municipal airport. Since Tondel's survey, one successful nuisance
case against a municipal airport has been found. In Ferguson v. Keene, Il1 N.H. 222,
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Despite its general lack of success in the airport context, nuisance
traditionally has been recognized as an appropriate action in pollution
suits."1 More recently, the concerns of environmentalists have caused
a resurgence of interest in nuisance actions as a means of opposing
2
polluters. 1
This note analyzes the nuisance defenses and remedies which Nestle
suggests may be encountered in an airport noise pollution suit. A nuisance remedy may be attractive to the homeowner because, unlike inverse condemnation, it avoids the overflight limitation and permits
recovery for personal injuries. In addition, nuisance may offer the
possibility of establishing a prima facie case merely by demonstrating
the existence of excessive noise levels. However, a municipal airport
has available the nuisance defenses of statutory tort immunity, legalized nuisance, and discretionary function which have often foreclosed
a nuisance action.
II.

GOVERNMENTAL DEFENSES TO A NUISANCE ACTION

A.

Statutory Tort Immunity

In response to the California Supreme Court's abolition of sovereign tort immunity,1 3 the California legislature enacted the California
Tort Claims Act of 1963,14 which makes a "public entity" immune
from tort liability "(e)xcept as otherwise provided by statute ....,,i5

279 A.2d 605 (1971) the court affirmed a $9,500 damage award for diminution of property value.
Other recent cases involving nuisance actions against municipal airports have been
unsuccessful. See, e.g., Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 12 Av. L. REP. (1972 Av. Cas.)
17,420 (D.C. Va., May 26, 1972) and Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 12 Av.
L. REP. (1972 Av. Cas.) 17, 105 (Cir. Ct. Ill.,
Oct. 29, 1971).
11. See note 12 infra.
12. See, e.g., Fadem & Berger, A Noisy Airport is a Damned Nuisance!, 3 Sw. U. L.
REV. 39 (1971); Porter, The Role of Private Nuisance Law in the Control of Air Pollultion, 10 ARIZ. L. REV. 107 (1968); Warren, Nuisance Law as an Environmental Tool, 7
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211 (1971); and Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70

COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970). The article by Fadem and Berger is of special interest because it was written by plaintiff's counsel in Nestle.
13. Sovereign immunity was abolished in Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55
Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, II Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961). For an authoritative discussion of
pre- and post-Tort Claims Act liability of governmental entities, see A. VAN ALSTYNE.
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY (1964).
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-895.8 (West 1966).
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1966). Unlike California, Washington has no
comprehensive tort claims act. Governmental entities in Washington are liable in tort to
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In Nestle, the basic immunity issue was whether the Civil Code's definition of nuisance 16 provided the requisite statutory basis contemplated by the California Tort Claims Act for imposing tort liability on
a municipal airport. In concluding that the Civil Code's definition was
an adequate statutory basis, the Nestle court relied upon numerous
grounds: several pre-Tort Claims Act cases which utilized the Civil
Code's definition of a nuisance to impose liability on a governmental
entity; 17 several post-Tort Claims Act cases in the court of appeals
which "impliedly recognized" a nuisance cause of action against governmental entities; 18 the California legislature's rejection of a proposed amendment to the Tort Claims Act which would have expressly
precluded a nuisance action against governmental entities;' 9 and the
20
legislature's clear interest in combating environmental pollution.
Many states, such as Washington, have abolished sovereign immunity without enacting comprehensive tort claims statutes restricting
governmental liability to certain legislatively defined acts. In contrast
to the California approach, these jurisdictions provide that governmental liability generally exists except where specific legislative acts or
judicial doctrines immunize the government. 21 Thus, in many jurisdictions there is no need to find a specific statute imposing liability as in
Nestle. However, even in jurisdictions which generally have abolished sovereign immunity, the legalized nuisance and discretionary
function doctrines frequently survive as independent governmental
defenses to a nuisance action. 22

the same extent as private individuals or corporations. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090
(Supp. 1971).
16. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3479 (West 1954) states:
Anything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or
an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property ... is a nuisance.
17. See, e.g., Vater v. County of Glenn, 49 Cal. 2d 815, 323 P.2d 85, (1958);
Mulloy v. Sharp Park Sanitary Dist., 164 Cal. App. 2d 438, 330 P.2d 441 (1958).
18. See Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1968); Burrows v. State, 260 Cal. App. 2d 29, 66 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1968); Granone v.
County of Los Angeles, 231 Cal. App. 2d 629, 42 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1965).
19.

Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 9 CAL. LAW REVISION

COMM. REP. 803 (Sept. 1969).
20. See Nestle, 496 P.2d at 491 n.13, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
21. See Van Aistyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 U.
ILL. L.F. 919 (1966).

22. Washington is illustrative. Even though sovereign immunity was abolished by
legislative enactment (see note 15 supra), both the legalized nuisance (see note 24 infra)
and discretionary function doctrines (see note 46 infra) remain.
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Legalized Nuisance

In the trial court, Santa Monica raised the legalized nuisance defense, alleging that the airport could not constitute a nuisance because
it was authorized to acquire and use property for airports23 and
"nothing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a
statute can be deemed a nuisance. 2 4 The California Supreme Court
stated that this statutory authorization to acquire and use property for
airports appeared too general to invoke the legalized nuisance de25
fense.
The legalized nuisance defense has frequently appeared not only in
airport cases, but highway, freeway, and railroad cases as well. While

the courts purport only to be interpreting the authorizing statutes in
these cases, the apparently conflicting decisions cannot be rationalized
on this basis. For example, in highway cases the courts routinely dis-

miss nuisance actions on the reasoning that highways are authorized
by the legislature and hence cannot be a nuisance, 2 6 while in airport
cases courts often hold that comparable legislative authorization will
not bar a nuisance action. 27 The difficulty in rationalizing these cases

23. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50470 (West 1966), CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21002, 21662,
21667 (West 1965). These statutes authorize the acquisition of property, construction of
facilities, and issuance of permits for airport facilities. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 14.08
(1959) similarly authorizes municipal airports in Washington.
24. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 (West 1954). Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48.160 (1959) similarly provides that nothing done under the authority of a statute can be a nuisance.
25. The court followed the rule of narrow construction of general authorization statutes articulated in Hassel v. San Francisco, II Cal. 2d 168, 171, 78 P.2d 1021, 1022
(1938):
A statutory sanction cannot be pleaded in justification of acts which by the general
rules of law constitute a nuisance, unless the acts complained of are authorized by
the express terms of the statute under which thejustification is made, or by the plainest and most necessary implication from the powers expressly conferred so that it
can be fairly stated that the legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which
occasions the injury.
26. See Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr.
240 (1968), and Deaconess Hosp. v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d
378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965).
27. See Nestle and Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. Dec. 663, 329 P.2d 210
(1958), aff'd on rehearing, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960). The first Ackerman
opinion was withheld from publication in Volume 52 of Washington Reports, Second
Series, pending determination of a petition for rehearing. Reporter's Note. 52 Wn. 2d
903 (1958). The case may, however, be found in the Pacific Reporter, Second Series. In
the rehearing in Ackerman the court recast its inverse condemnation discussion, but
found it unnecessary to discuss the nuisance issue because the court permitted recovery
in inverse condemnation. While neither Ackerman opinion found it necessary to base
recovery on a nuisance theory, the first Ackerman opinion clearly stated that were it
necessary to rely on a nuisance theory, legalized nuisance would not be a defense.
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and determining the applicability of the legalized nuisance doctrine in
the typical case where the legislature generally has authorized a particular activity stems from a lack of analysis in the decisions. Despite
this analytical vacuum, two factors appear to be present in these decisions: eminent domain considerations and balancing of the equities.
Eminent domain concepts defining constitutional takings influence
the legalized nuisance doctrine more fundamentally than equitable
considerations because the existence of a constitutional taking may
prevent application of the doctrine. The general relationship between
eminent domain and private nuisance was described by the United
28
States Supreme Court as follows:
We deem the true rule, under the 5th Amendment as under state
constitutions containing a similar prohibition to be that.., the
legislature... may not confer immunity from action for a private
nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of
private property for public use.
The crucial problem is ascertaining under what circumstances a private nuisance rises to the level of a constitutional taking and hence
becomes incapable of being immunized by legislative enactment.
Eminent domain concepts of taking, often aided by constitutional
damaging clauses, 29 have progressed from requiring physical invasion
and trespass to requiring no more than.interference with the use and
enjoyment of property. 30 Unconstitutional interferences with the enjoyable use of land which do not involve physical invasion strongly
resemble nuisance actions, giving rise to a form of inverse condemnation appropriately called condemnation by nuisance. 3 1 To the extent
that a nuisance action seeks recovery for damages otherwise compensable in a condemnation by nuisance action, the legalized nuisance
doctrine is inapplicable as a governmental defense because the legislature may not authorize the appropriation of private property for
public use without compensation, regardless of the label affixed to the

28. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 548 (1914).
29. Many state constitutions provide that compensation must be paid for private
property taken or damaged for public use. See note 9 supra.
30. See Stoebuck, Condemnation by Nuisance: the Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect,71 DICK. L. REV. 207 (1967) and Note, The Airport Noise Cases: Condemnation by Nuisance and Beyond, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 271 (1971).

31.

Id.
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action. 32 However, nuisance damages in excess of those compensable
in a condemnation action (primarily personal injury damages) are not
constitutionally immunized unless such damages are brought within
33
the penumbra of some other constitutional guarantee.
In addition to constitutional considerations which may limit the
ambit of the legalized nuisance defense, judicial desire to balance the
equities so as not to immunize actual nuisances may foreclose the defense entirely. Frequently in legalized nuisance decisions the appellate
courts appear to determine de novo whether a nuisance in fact exists by
independently weighing the plaintiff's harm against the utility of the
defendant's conduct. 34 If the plaintiffs harm outweighs the utility of
the defendant's conduct, indicating that a nuisance in fact exists, the
court under the guise of statutory interpretation will hold the defense
inapplicable. 35 Decisions are rare in which the court concedes that a
nuisance in fact exists but is not actionable because of immunity provided by the legalized nuisance defense. 3 6 In the cases where the defense is held applicable, the reasonableness or utility of the defendant's
activity is emphasized and the harm to the plaintiff is regarded as de
37
minimus, indicating that the existence of a nuisance is questionable.
32. Washington (Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964)),
Oregon (Thornberg v. Port of Portland, 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966)), and Florida
(Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1964)), have expressly adopted the condemnation by nuisance concept in the airport context.
33. The condemnation by nuisance theory only applies to property damage, not
personal injuries. However, other constitutional theories may protect personal integrity
from governmental interference and prohibit the application of the legalized nuisance
doctrine. See Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 12 Av. L. REP. (1972 Av. Cas.) 17.420
(D.C. Va., May 26, 1972) where the plaintiffs unsuccessfully asserted a ninth amendment theory to recover for personal injuries from jet noise.
34. A balancing of the utility of the actor's conduct against the gravity of the
ensuing harm is the heart of a nuisance action. See the definition of nuisance in Corbett
v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 166 So. 2d 196 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1964).
35. See Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497 (1952). This case, however, like the majority of reported airport cases, involved a private airport. Since the
utility of public air transportation is not a dominant factor in these private airport
cases, the equities usually favor the plaintiff.
See also Atkinson v. City of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) where the
court refused to enjoin construction of a runway because of the legalized nuisance doctrine, but then implied that if the runway were shown to be an actual nuisance, damages
could be recovered. The implication is that if the runway is in fact a nuisance, the legalized nuisance doctrine is inapplicable.
36. See State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 80 Ohio App. 340, 79 N.E.2d 698
(1947), where the court stated that annoyances and disturbances around public improvements which otherwise would be actionable are immunized by the legalized nuisance
doctrine.
37. See Deaconness Hosp. v. Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d 378, 403 P.2d 54
(1965), where the trial court found a freeway to be a private nuisance, but the supreme

910

Nuisance Actions Against Municipal Airports
The authorizing statute is relevant in this balancing process only to
the extent it evidences a legislative determination that the activity has
some public utility. Some courts go beyond this subtle balancing
process and flatly state that while legislative authorization will prevent
an airport from being a nuisance per se, it will not immunize an airport from being a nuisance in fact. 38 This judicial hesitancy to invoke
the legalized nuisance doctrine appears to. be based upon the high regard the judiciary holds for private landowners' rights, basic policy
considerations, and perhaps the underlying constitutional considerations.3 9 Thus, after balancing the equities, the legalized nuisance doctrine often will not be used to immunize a nuisance in fact under the
guise of statutory interpretation. In cases where the doctrine is invoked, the existence of a nuisance is questionable.
Nestle is consistent with these eminent domain and equitable considerations. Although the California court has not squarely faced the
condemnation by nuisance theory in the airport context,4 0 it is likely
that the court would accept this theory, making legalized nuisance a
constitutionally impermissible defense, at least as to property damage.
Also, equitable considerations strongly favor the homeowners' allegations of nuisance in Nestle because the offensive jet noise was created
by a relatively few business jet flights whose utility is low compared to
41
the annoyance inflicted upon the homeowners.
court reversed by invoking the legalized nuisance doctrine. While the court noted in one
sentence that the plaintiff presented substantial evidence on the nuisance issue, the
court's opinion is dominated by a discussion of the state's evidence that the freeway,

noise would not be excessive or unreasonable. In Carlson v. City of Wenatchee, 55 Wn.
2d 909, 350 P.2d 457 (1960), the court's emphasis upon the reasonableness of the defendant city's conduct indicates that it is questionable whether a nuisance in fact exists,
because by definition a nuisance results from unreasonable conduct.

38. This rule has been followed in Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 243 P.2d 497
(1952); Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S.E. 2d 245 (1942); Thrasher v. At-

lanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S.E. 817 (1934); Hyde v. Somerset Air Service, I N.J. Super.
546, 61 A.2d 645 (1948); Oechsle v. Ruhl, 140 NJ. Eq. 355, 54 A.2d 462 (1947); Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 152 Wash. Dec. 663, 329 P. 2d 210 (1958) (See note 27 supra).

A distinction must be noted in these airport cases between compensatory damage cases
and injunction cases, in addition to the public-private airport distinction. This distinction is important because injunctions often require a showing beyond that required in a
compensatory damage action. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg.
Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933) where the Court stated:

Where substantial redress can be afforded by the payment of money and the issuance of an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly disproportionate hard-

ship, equitable relief may be denied although the nuisance is indisputable.
39. See Comment, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
781 (1952), and the text accompanying notes 30-33 supra.
40. See note 61 infra.
41. See note I supra.
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Municipal airports with extensive commercial air service present a
more difficult equitable problem than Nestle because of the public
utility of commercial air service. However, Ackerman v. Port of
Seattle42 endorsed the rule that the legalized nuisance doctrine will not
immunize a large public airport with extensive commercial air service
from being a nuisance in fact, a result consistent with Nestle.
Rationalizing the highway and freeway noise cases, which generally
have denied recovery on a nuisance theory, with the airport noise
cases is difficult. However, the higher public use and long acceptance
of highways and freeways balanced against the generally lower noise
levels which they inflict upon surrounding homeowners make the existence of a nuisance in such cases at least arguable. 4 3 Also, the reluctance of courts to extend condemnation by nuisance to highway and
freeway noise reflects a judicial feeling that this noise constitutes everyday irritation that modern man must endure without compensation.
Recovery should be allowed in these cases, however, when the loudness of the noise approaches that present around airports, for compensation should depend upon the loudness of the noise, not just its
source. 44 An increased judicial acceptance of technical noise measurement would aid in comparing these various noise sources and lend
45
objectivity and consistency to noise litigation.
42. 152 Wash. Dec. 663, 329 P.2d 210, affd on rehearing, 55 Wn. 2d 400, 348 P.2d
664 (1960).
43. Jet noise for those living close to an airport generally exceeds the loudness and
irritability of other transportation noises. Jet noise is particularly irritating because of
its high frequency noise components. See the data presented in Alekshun, Aircraft Noise
Law: A Technical Perspective, 55 A.B.A.J. 740 (1969).
Public acceptance and use of highways and freeways is greater than that of airports.
Recent statistics indicate that 86% of domestic travelers (defined as those going out of
town overnight or more than 100 miles) utilized automobiles while 8% utilized commercial air service. See, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 209 (1972). These factors plus the indeterminate volume of potential
claims make the judiciary reluctant to allow nuisance or eminent domain recovery
against highway and freeway noise. See Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 266 Cal.
App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr. 240(1968).
44. The noise characteristics of the source are included in PNdb or dbA noise measurements which include an adjustment for the frequency characteristics of the human
ear. See Kryter, Scaling Human Reactions to the Sound from Aircraft, 31 J. ACOuST.
Soc. AM. 1415 (1959).
45. The difficulty in comparing highway and freeway noise with airport noise is the
continuous nature of the former and the intermittent nature of the latter. A factor based
on the peak single event noise level and the number of events in a given time span must
be applied to intermittent noise levels in order to allow comparison with continuous
noise levels of equal subjective irritability or loudness. While its purpose was not to
provide an aircraft noise measurement equivalent to a continuous noise level. Noise
Exposure Forecast (NEF) employs some of these concepts. See note 68 infra.
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C.

DiscretionaryFunction

In addition to the legalized nuisance defense, the discretionary
function defense, which immunizes municipal officials and entities
from tort claims arising from injuries sustained as a result of discretionary decisions, 46 frequently is raised in tort actions which result
from municipal activities. Although no mention of this defense appears in the Nestle opinion, it has been successfully employed by the
Air Force in several suits initiated by homeowners seeking compensa47
tion for noise damages resulting from the ground testing ofjet engines.
However, no authority has been found which clearly establishes
that a municipal airport may immunize itself from nuisance claims by
asserting that a decision to allow jet aircraft to utilize airport facilities
48
is discretionary.
The discretionary function defense, like the legalized nuisance defense, is clearly not available when the injury rises to the level of a
constitutional injury. Moreover, when a constitutional injury is not

persent, several arguments militate against invoking the defense. First,
nuisance focuses upon the harm or damage inflicted upon the plaintiff
by the defendant's conduct, which under traditional tort principles
generally must have been classified as intentional, negligent, or strict

liability conduct. 49 When the underlying conduct giving rise to the
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1966). The legislative intent is that this section
shall continue the previous common law doctrine of discretionary immunity. See Legislative Committee Comment, § 820.2. See also A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT
TORT LIABILITY § 5.51-5.57 (1964).

In contrast to California's codification of the discretionary immunity doctrine, the
doctrine in Washington is exclusively judicial. See Evangelical United Brethren Church
v. State, 67 Wn. 2d 243, 407 P.2d 440 (1965), 41 WASH. L. REV. 552 (1966).
47. In Leavall v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964), an air force decision to test jet engines in a particular location on the base was held to be a discretionary
function within the Federal Tort Claims Act. See also Nichols v. United States, 236 F.
Supp. 241 (S.D. Cal. 1964). Discretionary function arguments rarely appear in the airport nuisance decisions, the principal reason being that most of these nuisance decisions
involve private airport operators who may not invoke the defense.
48. In Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 12 Av. L. REP. (1972 Av. Cas.) 17,420 (D.C.
Va., May 26, 1972) the court said it was doubtful if relief could be granted against the
FAA as operator of Washington National Airport for noise complaints because the
FAA's allocation of traffic between Dulles and Washington National Airport was discretionary. Although the discretion exercised in VirginiansforDulles was the allocation
ofjet traffic between the two airports rather than the discretionary use ofjet aircraft, it is
the only case found in which an operator of a municipal airport attempted to utilize the
discretionary function defense.
49.

W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 574 (4th ed. 1971):

Today liability for nuisance may rest upon an intentional invasion of the plaintiff's
interests, or a negligent one, or conduct which is abnormal and out of place in its
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nuisance would subject the actor to strict liability, the purpose of the
discretionary function defense does not compel that it be applied to
bar a nuisance action. Recent discretionary function decisions establish that the purpose of the defense is to prevent judicial scrutiny of
the policy decisions of coordinate branches of government. 50 The
imposition of governmental liability for strict liability conduct,
whether for the conduct directly or for a nuisance action based upon
such conduct, does not offend this purpose because strict liability does
not involve the type of judicial scrutiny into the foreseeability, wisdom, or legality of governmental action which the defense seeks to
prevent.5 1 However, generation of jet aircraft noise has generally not
been classified as a strict liability activity, although the policy factors
which favor imposition of strict liability appear to be present. For
example, aircraft noise creates a considerable risk of harm to homeowners due to fault on neither side, commercial aviation has considerable value to the community and should be continued, and the expenses of aviation may be borne more equitably by commercial aviation than the homeowners. 52 A judicial acceptance of this theory
could permit the difficulties inherent in the discretionary function de53
fense to be avoided.
surroundings, and so falls fairly within the principle of strict liability. With very
rare exceptions, there is no liability unless the case can be fitted into one of these
familiar categories.
50. See Justice Stewart's dissent in Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972). and
Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
51. See Peck, Laird v. Ne/ns: A Call for Review and Revision of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REV. 391 (1973), for a general discussion of authorities.
The United States Supreme Court's rejection of strict liability as a basis of recovery
under the Federal Tort Claims Act in Nelms would preclude this theory of recovery
against federal defendants. The federal government, however, operates few airports.
Most cases, such as Nestle, involve airports operated by local governments and thus
involve exclusively state law rather than federal law.
52.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), and

compare the argument for imposition of strict liability upon sonic boom in Baxter, The
SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1968).
Other areas of environmental concern have imposed strict liability upon participants.
See the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 1161, et seq. which imposes strict liability upon oil handlers.
53. This argument may, however, be overly technical. Rarely does a court concern
itself with the classification of the underlying tortious conduct which gave rise to the
nuisance. Even if the infliction of jet noise upon surrounding homeowners is termed intentional by traditional tort principals, the purpose of the discretionary function defense
does not compel that it be applied to immunize government. Nuisance only involves a
determination that the effect of the defendant's conduct upon the plaintiff is unreasonable, not that the defendant's conduct itself is unreasonable. The discretionary function
defense seeks to prevent the latter kind of inquiry, which arises most frequently in negligence actions.
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Second; a primary policy factor militating against invoking the discretionary function defense is the desirability of equitably distributing
the costs of municipal activities by compensating those few who sustain damage as a result of activities which benefit all. Noise damage
deliberately inflicted upon homeowners resulting from public transportation is a strong policy factor pointing towards nonapplication of
the defense. 5 4 Third, a prerequisite of invoking the defense is that a
government official actually has studied and weighed the risks and
advantages of a particular policy decision; there is no need to protect
discretion if in fact none was exercised. 55 Many airports were established before jet aircraft with their increased ambit of irritation came
into use, making discretionary decisions about airport location based
upon jet aircraft characteristics impossible. Upon the subsequent introduction of jet aircraft at existing airports, it is questionable whether
airport officials weighed the risks as well as the advantages of their use,
or whether jet aircraft were just accepted as an inevitable technological
advance. In any event, airport officials should sustain the burden of
establishing that someone did in fact render a discretionary decision. 56
III.

THE SCOPE OF A NUISANCE REMEDY

A.

The Overflight Rule

The Nestle court raised several issues which emphasize the wider
compensatory scope of a nuisance remedy as compared to the more
common inverse condemnation remedy. First, the court did not limit
recovery under the nuisance theory to only those homeowners directly
54.

Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.

REv. 209, 227-28 (1963), argues that recovery against government for tortious destruction of property should be allowed notwithstanding the discretionary function defense
because the equity in allowing compensation is the predominant consideration. This

argument applies with equal force when property is damaged as well as totally destroyed.
55. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 361 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240,
249 n.8 (1968).

56.

See Peck, supra note 51, for a discussion of authorities supporting the position

that the discretionary function defense when applicable should be an affirmative defense.

In the City of Santa Monica's Petition for Rehearing in Nestle it is interesting to note
that the city admits it made no effort to control jet aircraft flights from the airport and
argues that it was powerless to do so because of federal preemption of the aircraft noise
field. Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing, Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920,
496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972).
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under the flight path,5 7 a limitation which frequently has appeared in
inverse condemnation suits.58 Under the overflight theory, low flying
aircraft are held to have taken a compensable easement or servitude
by flying directly over the plaintiffs property and invading the superadjacent airspace. This rationale leads to the rather absurd result that
homeowners directly under the flight path will be compensated, while
those equally affected but a few feet to the side of the flight path receive no compensation. 5 9 Since more recent and better reasoned decisions have abandoned this tenuous distinction, 60 it is likely that the
California court, which has not yet ruled directly on the issue, will
follow these later decisions and eliminate overflight as a prerequisite
of recovery in inverse condemnation. 6 1 A nuisance action, nontrespassory in nature, does not require overflight, thereby avoiding the restrictive standing requirements of inverse condemnation in those jurisdictions retaining the overflight rule.
B.

PersonalInjuries

Second, the court did not limit recovery to diminution of property
value. In contrast to inverse condemnation which is based upon a
taking of property and which limits recovery to diminution of prop57. The diverse location of the plaintiffs' residences around the airport is detailed by
the Appellate Court decision in Nestle, 19 Cal. App. 3d 869, 874, 97 Cal. Rptr. 235. 240
(1971).
58. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), is the leading overflight
case. Courts frequently make a distinction in applying the overflight rule based upon
whether the state's constitution contains only a taking clause, in which case the overflight rule is appropriate, or also a damaging clause, in which case it is not. See
Ferguson v. City of Keene, 108 N.H. 409, 238 A.2d 1 (1968). For a complete history of cases see Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power but Local Liability, 3 URBAN LAW. 175 (1971). See also Comment, The Airport Noise Cases: Condetonation by Nuisance and Beyond, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 271 (1971).
59.

See the dissenting opinion in Batten, 306 F.2d at 585-87. The absurdity of the

overflight rule would have been highlighted by the SST with its thunderous sideline
noise (in excess of 120 EPNdb at .35 nautical mile to the side of the runway) but comparatively mild overflight noise (108 EPNdb at 3.5 nautical miles from brake release)
since an application of the overflight rule would deny recovery to those homeowners
exposed to the sideline noise. See THE SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

(Boeing Publication, Aug. 1970).
60. See Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wn. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964); Thornberg v.
Port of Portland. 244 Ore. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966). See Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off Pandora'sBox?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920 (1965).
61. Van Alstyne. Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteriafor Legislative Modifications in Califbrnia, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 491 (1969). and Comment. The Jet
Set and the Law: A Summary of Recent Developments in Noise Law as it Relates
to Airport and Aircraft Operations in California, I PACIFIC L.J. 581 (1970), both pre-
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erty value alone, 62 nuisance permits both recovery for diminution of
64
property value 63 and recovery for personal injuries and annoyance.
Recognizing this distinction, the Nestle court affirmed the judgment
for Santa Monica on the inverse condemnation theory because substantial evidence supported the trial court's ruling that no diminution
in property value had occurred, but the court allowed the homeowners to amend their complaint to allege damages for personal injuries from excessive noise. Since the absence of provable injury to real
property did not foreclose the nuisance action, Nestle makes it clear
dict California will follow the nonoverflight cases. The court of appeals in Nestle v. City
of Santa Monica, 19 Cal. App. 3d 869, 97 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1971) concluded that the
overflight rule was obsolete. See also Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Av. L. REP. (1970
Av. Cas.) 17,642 (Sup. Ct. Los Angeles, 1970).
62. Damages for personal injury, annoyance, or discomfort are not recoverable
under an inverse condemnation theory (except to the extent they are indirectly recoverable via a diminution in property value) because such injuries have been held not to
constitute a taking or damaging of a property interest. See Brandenberg v. Los Angeles
County Flood Control Dist., 45 Cal. App. 2d 306, 114 P.2d 14 (1941). See also, Van
Alstyne, A Study Relating to Soverign Immunity, 5 CALIF. LAW REVISION COMM'N
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1, 102-06 (1963). The rule is substantially the

same in Washington. See Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid
off Pandora'sBox?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920 (1965).
63. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 602-03 (4th ed. 1971).

64. A defendant in a landowner's private nuisance action in California is liable for
personal injuries as well as discomfort and annoyance, regardless of whether personal
injury was sustained. Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 45 Cal. 2d 265, 288 P.2d
507 (1955). The court in Nestle apparently considered the homeowner's cause of action
to be a private nuisance action, since all of the cases cited in the court's opinion to support the proposition that homeowners be allowed to amend their complaint and allege
personal injuries are private nuisance cases. In the trial court, homeowners alleged the
airport was both a public and private nuisance. There is also authority that a public
nuisance can be a private nuisance with respect to the individual landowner. See Fisher
v. Zumwalt, 128 Cal. 493, 61 P.82 (1900).
In Washington a defendant in a private nuisance action may be liable for property
damage, physical injuries and possibly discomfort and inconvenience. In Riblet v.
Spokane-Portland Cement Co., 45 Wn. 2d 346, 353, 274 P.2d 574, 578 (1954) the court
stated:
This court has recognized that recovery may be had for "sickness, suffering, mental
anguish and bodily infirmities" resulting from nuisance, in addition to property
damage. .
An airport in Washington would seem to be a public nuisance since it interferes with
the rights of a "considerable number of persons." WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.130 (1959).
Washington apparently adopts the minority rule that public nuisances are interferences
with the individual rights of a large number of persons rather than infringements of
rights common to the public. However, see Deaconess Hosp. v. Washington State
Highway Comm'n, 66 Wn. 2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965) where an action for freeway
noise was brought as a private nuisance. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.48.210 (1959), authorizes
a civil action for a public nuisance by a private person if he has sustained "special injury." "Special injury" may include injury to property and personal injuries. See Comment, Nuisance as a Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REV. 47 (1970). See generally
PROSSER, note 49 supra.The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) seeks to liberalize
these standing requirements. See Bryson & Macbeth, Public Nuisance, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, and Environmental Law, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 241 (1972).
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that damages under a nuisance theory are not limited to diminution in
65
property value as they are under an inverse condemnation theory.
C.

Prima Facie Nuisance Actions

Finally, the court raised an issue which may increase the attractiveness of the nuisance remedy in the future. The Nestle court suggested
that excessive noise levels alone might be sufficient to establish a
prima facie case for personal injuries. 66 This presumption is particularly helpful for plaintiffs because it would ease the difficult proof
problems which they currently face in establishing personal injuries
(such as hearing loss) which advance almost imperceptibly over
a long period of time. Usually plaintiffs have no pre-injury physical
reports with which to compare their current physical capabilities and
hence cannot prove the fact of injury or causation. Although the
use of specific noise levels to establish prima facie cases has been uti67
lized in other areas of the law such as violations of noise ordinances,
the presumption creates a problem in ascertaining what constitutes an
excessive noise level. Several authorities and agencies have prescribed
maximum desirable airport noise levels which could serve to establish
prima facie excessive noise levels. 68 However, such noise data has met
65. This result is really not a departure from previous California law, but rather is
an extension of Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal.2d 25, 243 P.2d 497 (1952), to public airports. In Anderson the plaintiffs were awarded a money judgment on a nuisance theory
for the discomfort and annoyance caused by aircraft utilizing a private airport.
66. See Nestle, 496 P.2d at 483 n.2, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 571. While the court specifically said it did not reach the issue, most likely the court would not have raised the issue
unless it felt the theory was plausible.
67. Traditionally, municipal noise ordinances used the nuisance concept of unreasonableness to establish violations, but more recently such ordinances specify maximum
noise levels for compliance with the law. See 115 CONG. REC. 32,178-258 (daily ed. Oct.
29, 1969) for a compilation of ordinances. In City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles,
451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971), the court accepted specific noise levels as prima facie evidence that the plaintiff property owners had suffered the requisite $10,000 damage for
federal court jurisdiction.
68. Noise Exposure Forecast (NEF) is an aircraft noise measurement developed
under FAA auspices which includes in a single number both the single event noise level
plus the number of events in a given time interval. For a discussion of NEF and its land
use interpretations see Galloway & Bishop, Noise Exposure Forecasts: Evolution, Evaluiation, Extensions and Land Use Interpretations,(Univ. of Washington Eng. Library
Microfilm No. AD-711 13 1, Aug. 1970). The FAA itself has been reluctant to define
any given noise level as excessive.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development promulgated a policy circular
in 1971 (No. 1390.2, July 16, 1971) defining undesirable noise levels for mortgaging
purposes. These authorities establish the general maximum desirable noise level for residential districts as NEF not greater than 30 or as a noise level not greater than 65 dbA
in excess of 8 hours per day. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, TRANSPORTATION
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69
with mixed judicial acceptance.

IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Nestle's acceptance of a nuisance action against a municipal airport
reveals a welcome judicial sympathy for the plight of the acoustically
harassed homeowner. These nuisance actions may be justified by several policy arguments: nuisance actions aid in equitably spreading the
cost of public projects, help to provide the necessary impetus for effective agency action to control aircraft noise at its source, and encourage
the airport operator to consider the interests of surrounding homeowners.
The basic principle underlying both nuisance and inverse condemnation actions against public entities is the redistribution of the unfairly placed costs of public projects.70 This principle of equitable cost
spreading is so basic to our law that it can be found in such diverse
areas as federal and state constitutions, tort claims acts, and taxation.
Federal inaction may well have been one of the considerations
prompting the Nestle court to allow a nuisance remedy. The Federal
Aviation Administrative (FAA) with its technical capability and expertise should provide effective agency action in this area. 7 1 However, the
FAA did not publish aircraft noise certification standards until 1969,72

NOISE AND ITS CONTROL (1972). Other governmental agencies have established excessive
noise levels for working conditions. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1972).
69. Compare the reliance on NEF in Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 11 Av. L. REP.
(1970 Av. Cas.) 17,642 (Sup. Ct. Los Angeles, 1970) with the polite contempt for NEF
in Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 12 Av. L. REP. (1972 Av. Cas.) 17,420 (E. D. Va.,
May 26, 1972).
70. See Van Alstyne, A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 5 CALIF. LAw
REVISION COMM'N REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 1, 225-30 (1963).
This rationale is just as appropriate for personal injury as for property damage and assumes increasing importance as more of the debilitating effects of noise overexposure
become evident.
Much research has been done and is continuing on the relationship between noise and
physiological damage. For example, on the relationship between hearing impairment
and noise, see Predicting Hearing Impairment From A-Weighted Sound Levels, 42 J.
AcousT. Soc'y AM. 1151 (1967). On the possible relationship between noise and heart
disease, see Rosen, HearingLoss and CoronaryHeartDisease,82 ARCHIVES OF OTOLARYNGOLOGY 236 (1965). See generally Hildebrand, Noise Pollution: An Introduction to the
Problem and an Outlinefor Future Legal Research, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 653 (1970).
71. See W. GELLHORN &C. BYsE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (5th ed. 1971).
72. It has been argued that the FAA had no power to set such standards prior to the
1968 Act giving the Administrator express authority to set noise certification standards
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and it is arguable whether these standards are sufficiently stringent
to provide effective relief,73 suggesting that the FAA has not accorded
the interests of homeowners sufficient weight in relation to the economic interests of the air carriers in determining the feasibility of
noise control.7 4 Where an agency has inadequately considered a
group's interests, judicial action such as the Nestle decision is warranted not only to offer alternative relief but also to provide the im75
petus for a reevaluation of agency priorities.
(49 U.S.C. § 143 1(a) (Supp. 1972)). However, the FAA probably had the authority to
enact noise standards under its broad power to establish aircraft safety standards. For a
general discussion, see Larson, Improving the Airport Environment: Effect ofthe 1969
FAA Regulationson Noise, 55 IOWA. L. REV. 808 (1970).
73. Congress expressed its concern over the adequacy of aircraft noise standards by
recently enacting the Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574. The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was given the authority to study
and report on the adequacy of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) noise standards,
in addition to other aircraft noise control functions formerly exercised exclusively by
the FAA.
A major inadequacy of the FAA's noise standards is the failure to provide for a lowering of the permissible noise levels over time, similar to the time table prescribed for
auto emissions. As time passes and noise technology advances, the permissible noise
levels should be lower. Research indicates that noise levels substantially lower than
those permitted by the current FAA certification standards are feasible. See, e.g., Sanders. A Quiet Engine for Stilling Complaints, II ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS 40
(Jan., 1973). It is essential that more stringent noise standards be announced far in advance to accommodate the long lead time required between the aircraft design phase and
actual commercial service.
Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 763-64 (1970) presents a
good discussion of the FAA noise rules and their lack of rigor.
74. While the FAA is given the function of promoting civil aviation (49 U.S.C. §
1346 (1970)), it is also expressly directed to consider standards for the control of aircraft
noise. (49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. 1972)). Forced to balance the cost of noise control hardware to the air carriers against environmental tranquility for homeowners living near
airposts, the FAA must resolve the basic issue of how large a cost is "economically feasible." The FAA largely has sided with the air carriers in opposing retrofit programs for
the DC-8, 707, and 727 type aircraft. However, studies have indicated that substantial
noise reduction on these models may be achieved at relatively modest cost. See the
study prepared by the Rohr Corporation for the Department of Transportation, EcoNOMIC IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING ACOUSTICALLY TREATED NACELLE AND DUCT CONFIGURATIONS APPLICABLE TO Low BYPASS TURBOFAN ENGINES (1970).

In addition to the basic environmental quality issue, noise suppression may be economically justifiable to the air carriers because it is the main factor inhibiting aviation
and airport growth. See Goldstein, Aircraft Noise and the Selection of Airport Sites, 4
URBAN LAW. 548 (1972). Thus, the interests of the homeowners and the air carriers are
not totally adverse.
75. This impetus may come indirectly from the publicity that court decisions generate or perhaps more directly from the congressional and agency influence that concerned airport operators desirous of avoiding legal liability possess.
Court action to protect homeowners located near airports is analogous to the increased judicial protection afforded many interested people by the recently expanded
rules on standing to challenge administrative action. See, e.g., Comment, Standing of
Conservation Groups as Conservation Groups: An Expanding Right?, 66 Nw. U.L.
REV. 554 (1971). The judicial actions inboth situations insure that people whose interests
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Nestle also emphasizes the duty of airport operators7 6 to locate new
airports and to expand and operate existing facilities with proper'regard for the surrounding homeowners, who are as much a part of the
"public interest" as the traveling public. Imposing legal liability upon
offensive municipal activities has in the past encouraged more careful
design and operation of such activities. For example, litigation
77
prompted deodorization of municipal sewage disposal systems.
Imposing legal liability upon airport operations similarly may result in
78
more circumspect airport operation and construction.
Thus, the Nestle decision seems attuned to both the public concern
over the quality of the environment and the widespread realization
that airports, like everything else, must coexist with their neighbors.
Nuisance is capable of facilitating this coexistence by providing ample
compensatory relief to those aggrieved.
G.E.F.

are adversely affected are included in the agency's decision-making process. For a discussion of these political forces at work, see G. STEVENSON, JR., THE POLITICS OF AIRPORT NOISE (1972).
76. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962), firmly settled that the airport
operator is responsible in aircraft noise damage suits.
77. Sewage plant cases are not as frequent as they once were. See, e.g., Southworth
v. City of Seattle, 145 Wash. 138, 259 P. 26 (1927).
78. The Nestle decision has already prompted the Los Angeles Board of Airport
Commissioners to adopt a new noise abatement program, which includes requirements
that aircraft approaches be made over the ocean, and that preferential treatment be afforded aircraft that meet the FAA noise regulations. The airport commission reported
that these new noise abatement rules were necessary because of the voluminous damage
claims filed against the airport and because "the courts have established a precedent of
holding the airports liable for nuisance damages from noise." See 98 AVIATION WEEK
AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY

34 (Jan. 8, 1973).
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